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Abstract 
Openness (of a system or architecture), though intuitively understood, remains difficult to quantify 
in terms of its value. Although commonly associated with cost avoidance, system openness can 
also increase costs. Previous efforts have relied on highly qualitative system analyses, with the 
results often articulated as an intangible “openness score,” for determining which of multiple 
system implementations is more open. Such approaches do not provide enough information to 
make a business case or understand the conditions under which life-cycle cost avoidance can be 
maximized (or whether there even is cost avoidance). This paper develops a multivariate model 
that quantifies the relationship between system openness and life-cycle cost. A case study that 
evaluates the utility of the second phase of the Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (A-RCI) Sonar 
System’s evolution to an open system is discussed. 
Keywords: Open systems, Cost modeling, Obsolescence management, A-RCI 
Introduction 
The United States faces several long-term budgetary challenges. The rising costs of 
mandatory entitlement programs, coupled with the budget deficits projected into the foreseeable 
future, create inevitable downward pressure on future Department of Defense (DoD) budgets. As 
an example, the DoD’s 2020 budget request for acquisition was $247 billion (about one-third of 
its total budget request): $143 billion for procurement and $104 billion for research, development, 
test, and evaluation (RDT&E). This amount is approximately 1% less than the amount 
appropriated for 2019 when adjusted for inflation. Under the 2020 Future Years Defense Program 
(FYDP), this downward trend is expected to continue through 2024, decreasing the budget to 
$230 billion adjusted for inflation. This 7% decrease will constrain the funds available for 
recapitalization, modernization, and transformation of the military (Congressional Budget Office 
[CBO], 2019). Future DoD budgets will require hard decisions and force a reengineering of 
processes and the most efficient use of resources.  
DoD weapon systems have historically been developed using acquired proprietary 
systems and interfaces. These make it challenging to modernize and reduce opportunities for 
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competition. For example, the Air Force’s program to upgrade the B-2 bomber’s communications, 
networking, and defensive management will cost over $2 billion, since the prime contractor owns 
all the necessary proprietary technical data and software. Completing this effort was not a viable 
financial option (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2014).  
A variety of strategies are being explored or reemphasized to increase the efficiencies of 
acquisition processes. One way for the DoD to minimize the cost and time needed to modify or 
upgrade weapon systems is by using a modular open systems approach (MOSA) for system 
design and development. When used appropriately, MOSA provides a degree of flexibility, 
enabling the integration of rapidly changing technologies. However, as with all approaches, there 
are costs as well as benefits. This paper explores a business case methodology to assess the 
cost effectiveness of MOSA. 
Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) 
System openness refers to the extent to which system components (e.g., hardware and 
software) can be independently integrated, removed, or replaced without adverse impact on the 
existing system. Current DoD policy calls for the use of modular open systems design to the 
maximum extent possible. In fact, the acquisition strategy for a given system must identify where, 
why, and how modular open systems will be used (DoD, 2015). Conventional wisdom supports 
the notion of open systems, but quantifying the actual cost avoidance remains elusive. The 
objective of this paper is to quantify the relationship between system openness and life-cycle cost. 
Open Systems Architecture, now referred to as Modular Open Systems Approach 
(MOSA), has been widely endorsed by the DoD since the mid-1990s. MOSA promotes the use of 
modular design to encourage companies to improve and manufacture technology that is 
interoperable with the DoD’s current system. Formally, the DoD defines MOSA as “a technical 
and business strategy for designing an affordable and adaptable system.” An example of this 
could be the use of radar technology on an aircraft. Under MOSA, the radar technology could be 
replaced or upgraded without replacing the whole aircraft or numerous related subsystems. 
Closed systems architecture, on the other hand, effectively restricts access to configuration and 
programming information from outside parties. Closed systems often make upgrading a piece of 
equipment difficult and costly. Further, these closed systems can lead to vendor lock. where the 
DoD becomes dependent on a single service provider because the costs of changing vendors is 
prohibitive. 
In 1994, the Open Systems Joint Task Force (OSJTF) was established to promote the use 
of open systems architecture from the top-down throughout the DoD. Ever since, there has been 
an ongoing effort throughout the Department to widely implement open systems architecture. In 
May 2003, DoD Directive 5000.01 emphasized the use of “modular, open-systems approach … 
where feasible” (DoD, 2018). Further, in 2004, the OSJTF was identified as the DoD lead for 
MOSA. Soon after, OSJTF stated that MOSA would be an integral part needed to improve the 
DoD’s joint combat capabilities.  
In a January 2015 DoD Directive, program managers were further directed to use an open-
systems approach wherever “feasible and cost-effective” (DoD, 2015). Specifically, program 
managers are to use the Acquisition Strategy to identify where, why, and how MOSA will or will 
not be used. Once the Acquisition Strategy document is completed, the formal project or 
procurement can begin. Under the “Business Strategy” section of the Acquisition Strategy, 
managers are instructed to complete a business case analysis calculation with the help of 
engineering tradeoff analysis “that outlines the approach for using open systems architecture and 
acquiring technical data rights” (DoD, 2015). Finally, managers must compare and analyze the 
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results of open architecture to closed architecture to determine which is most cost effective given 
the military’s specific need.  
In 2017, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 
amended and formalized the implementation of MOSA (Pub. L. 114–328; 10 U.S.C. § 2446a, 
2016). Following January 1, 2019, the 2017 NDAA stated that MOSA “shall be designed and 
implemented, to the maximum extent possible … to enable incremental development and 
enhance competition, innovation, and interoperability.” In January 2019, a memo from the 
secretary of the Navy, the secretary of the Air Force, and the secretary of the Army emphasized 
their commitment to MOSA, stating “further development of Modular Open Systems Approach 
standards in areas where we lack them is vital to our success.” The most recent NDAA for FY 
2020 put responsibility on the secretaries of the military departments to implement MOSA (Pub. 
L. 116–92; 10 U.S.C. § 840, 2019). Each branch has responded in slightly different ways to 
implement MOSA. Broadly, DoD leadership and Congress strongly support MOSA and hope to 
implement it more completely in the near future. 
An open systems approach (OSA), when used in conjunction with a modular architecture, 
reuse, and/or the harnessing of existing technologies (commercial off-the-shelf [COTS] or 
proprietary), is commonly associated with cost avoidances arising from more efficient design, 
increased competition among suppliers, more efficient innovation and technology insertion 
(faster, cheaper design evolution), and the modularization of qualification. However, the high 
levels of investment and the increased risk exposure over long system life cycles are often 
overlooked. Determining if, and to what extent, openness should be pursued remains challenging 
in the absence of a quantitative model that elucidates the relationship between the degree of 
system openness and the system’s life-cycle cost.  
Historically, critical functionality in complex electronic systems was provided by custom-
made components and custom proprietary architectures, requiring long development times and 
high development costs. However, recent technological advancements have allowed for the 
increased generalizability of both hardware and software (and system architecture); now 
components can be designed once, and then used in many different applications (Guertin & Miller, 
1998). These advancements have increased the viability of using OSA in general and a Modular 
Open Systems Approach (MOSA) in particular (Abbott, Levine, & Vasilakos, 2008).  
While the DoD supports implementing MOSA whenever possible, there are numerous 
reasons to be cautious since business and engineering-tradeoffs must be made, possibly 
changing the incentive structure and reducing the system effectiveness. First, if there are no 
standards for a new product, then closed system architecture may be best until standards are 
created (Firesmith, 2015). Second, a poorly designed modularized architecture may be too costly 
to re-architect, and it is better to stick with the old. Third, there is only one qualified vendor to 
provide the service, making opening the system costly without benefit. These drawbacks 
challenge the current DoD posture of implementing MOSA throughout the department, but neither 
side has successfully provided quantitative analysis to support their position. 
Generally, it is taken for granted that the use of OSA and MOSA decreases the total life-
cycle cost of a system. Leveraging existing open technology, including COTS components, avoids 
many costs associated with designing custom systems and reduces the time required for 
development or refresh of a system (Logan, 2004). The use of OSA or MOSA helps mitigate the 
effects of obsolescence, lengthens the system’s support life, allows for the incremental insertion 
of new technologies (Open Systems Joint Task Force [OSJTF], 2004; Boudreau, 2007), and 
evolving functionality. The use of well-defined standards promotes smooth interfacing both within 
and between systems, while the proliferation of common component types fosters competition 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 4 - 
 
between suppliers. Component design reuse (within and between systems) eliminates redundant 
components, thus reducing logistical costs. 
However, there are costs associated with openness that should be considered. Building a 
subsystem from open standards and commercially available components often relies on the use 
of generalized technology with unnecessary, and costly, additional functionality, increasing the 
cost, complexity, and effective failure rates (Bass et al., 2008; Hanratty, Lightsey, & Larson, 2002). 
In other cases, it may be necessary to modify COTS components to meet performance 
requirements (Jensen & Petersen, 1982; Wright, Humphrey, & McCluskey, 1997), thereby adding 
costs. In addition, the enterprise that manages the system likely has no control over the supply 
chains for COTS components, which tend to be more volatile than proprietary ones (Lewis, Hyle, 
Parrington, Clark, Boehm, Abts, & Manners 2000). This makes it desirable to refresh open 
systems designs more frequently (Abts, 2002; Clark & Clark, 2007), which leads to an increase 
in the number of fielded configurations, which complicates logistics, resulting in more expense. 
This paper seeks to quantitatively analyze MOSA, specifically the relationship between 
MOSA and life-cycle cost. Throughout numerous DoD documents, some form of life-cycle cost 
savings is cited a majority of the time as a reason to support MOSA implementation. One study 
cites preliminary results compiled from 10 years of data on both the Acoustic Rapid COTS 
Insertion program and its predecessor. These results indicate that life-cycle cost improved by 
nearly 5:1, but the underlying data is unavailable (Boudreau, 2006). Without quantitative analysis, 
DoD program managers are left without much guidance on when MOSA is best given life-cycle 
costs.  
Existing Work 
Several previous efforts have addressed the measurement of system openness. These 
include the MOSA Program Assessment and Rating Tool (PART), developed by the Navy’s 
OSJTF. PART consists of a series of questions, divided into business indicators and technical 
indicators, that assess the extent to which a certain principle or practice is implemented. PART 
can be used to measure a system’s openness, but it is subjective and qualitative, and the results 
depend on the optimism with which the survey is completed (OSJTF, 2004).  
The Naval Open Architecture Enterprise Team (NOAET) developed the Open Architecture 
Assessment Model (OAAM) to “define, measure, and illustrate the relative levels of openness” 
(Naval Open Architecture Enterprise Team [NOAET], 2009). Like PART, OAAM measures the 
openness of a system using both business and technical characteristics, which are combined to 
produce an overall openness characterization. While OAAM was relatively simple, it lacked 
resolution, so NOAET created the Open Architecture Assessment Tool (OAAT) to expand and 
build upon OAAM (NOAET, 2009). OAAT uses a questionnaire that includes PART to assess 
system openness (NOAET, 2009).  
In 2011 and 2012, several parties, including the Air Force Research Laboratory’s RYM 
subgroup, collaborated to develop a set of metrics to evaluate the openness of an architecture. 
This effort focused on selecting metrics that were broad enough to assess a general case and 
quantifiable, so that the measurement would be repeatable. The result of this effort, called the 
MOSA Metrics Calculator (MOSA, 2012), improves upon the PART questionnaire by ensuring 
that all metrics are quantifiable. 
One common attribute of the PART, OAAT, and the MOSA Metrics Calculator is that they 
don’t account for the cost associated with an open systems approach and are unable to measure 
the value of the benefits obtained. They cannot be used to make a business case for the use of 
openness (i.e., they explicitly assume that increased openness is always beneficial, but is it?). 
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Another approach to measuring openness comes from PMH Systems and the University 
of Southampton. This work uses an easily quantifiable metric, the fraction of interfaces that use 
open standards, and a stochastic model to estimate the decrease in cost and development time 
associated with increasing openness (Henderson, 2009). However, the model implicitly relies on 
the assumption that increased openness is always beneficial. Additionally, the metric developed 
cannot resolve different levels of openness and, most importantly, only addresses the design 
phase, ignoring significant costs and avoidances that occur later in the system’s life cycle. 
Research Objectives 
Previous efforts have relied on a highly qualitative analysis of a system, with the results 
often given as an intangible “openness score” used to determine which of multiple system 
implementations is more open. Such approaches do not provide enough information to make a 
business case or understand the conditions under which life-cycle cost avoidance can be 
maximized (or whether there even is cost avoidance). The objective of this paper is to quantify 
the relationship between system openness and life-cycle cost; the key questions the model 
presented can answer are 
• What are the costs avoided and added due to openness? 
• What are the variables that should be considered in assessing the cost impact? 
• What level of openness provides the best value to the government/customer? 
• How long will a given open system need to be supported to recover its initial costs? 
• How should current policy be modified to ensure an appropriate level of openness is 
applied? 
The discussion of open system pros and cons in the Introduction is by no means 
exhaustive, but meant to point out the complexity that is present in this problem. One possible 
breakdown of the total cost incurred designing, building, operating, and retiring a system is1 
 CTotal = CDesign + CProduction + CO&S + CRefresh/Redesign + CEnterprise (1) 
 
where the sections Design and Qualification Costs (CDesign and CRefresh/Redesign) through 
Enterprise Costs (CEnterprise) discuss the modeling of the various contributions to Equation 1.   
The Model Development section proposes a stochastic discrete-event simulation model 
developed to determine the difference in life-cycle and implementation cost between two versions 
of the same system (having different levels of openness). The Case Study section provides a case 
study using the model. In the Discussion and Conclusions section, we discuss the generalization 
of the model to consider more general questions about the optimal openness of systems. 
 
Model Development 
This section presents a stochastic discrete-event simulation model developed to 
determine the difference in life-cycle and implementation cost between two versions of the same 
system (having different levels of openness). 
Discrete-Event Simulation Model Development 
The model developed follows the life history of a group of items (e.g., a bill of materials 
[BOM]). Life-cycle cost modeling generally involves modeling systems (more specifically, system 
costs) that evolve over time. For complex systems, the time-dependent costs usually involve the 
 
1 Some preliminary work done formulating a model based on the Equation 1 appears in Schramm (2013). 
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operation and support of the system. Depending on the type of system, operation may involve the 
purchase of fuel, the training of people, the cost of various consumable materials, and 
maintenance. Maintenance costs that occur over time are combinations of labor, equipment, 
testing, and spare parts. If the life cycle of a system is relatively short (i.e., less than a couple of 
years), then direct calculation methods of the life-cycle cost are applicable. However, when the 
modeled life cycle extends over significant periods of time and the cost of money is non-zero, the 
calculation of life-cycle cost changes from a multiplication problem into a summation problem, 
and the dates of cost events become important (e.g., the cost of individual maintenance events 
differ based on when they occur due to the cost of money). Discrete-event simulation is commonly 
used to model life-cycle costs that are accumulated over time when time spans are long and the 
cost of money is non-zero. 
Discrete-event simulation (DES) is the process of codifying the behavior of a complex 
system as an ordered sequence of well-defined events. In the context of life-cycle cost modeling, 
an event represents a particular change in the system’s state at a specific point in time, and the 
change in state generally has cost consequences. Discrete-event simulation utilizes a 
mathematical/logical model of a physical system that portrays state changes at precise points in 
simulated time, called events. Discrete means that successive changes are separated by finite 
amounts of time, and by definition, nothing relevant to the model changes between events. In 
DES, the system “clock” jumps from one event to the next, and periods between events are 
ignored. A timeline is defined as a sequence of events and the times that they occur. 
At each event, various properties of the system can be calculated and accumulated. 
Probability distributions are used to represent the uncertainty in the simulation parameters in 
discrete-event simulation. This means that we simulate the timeline (and accumulate relevant 
parameters) with many trials (i.e., through many possible time histories) in order to build a 
statistical model of what will happen in the life history of the system. 
In the model developed for this paper (Figure 1) the events of interest are maintenance 
events, production events (delivery of new systems), retirement events (retirement of fielded 
systems), logistics events (management of spares, lifetime buys of parts to manage 
obsolescence) and design redesigns/refreshes. The accumulated properties of interest are cost. 
The model effectively generates lists of events (date and type of event). The event dates are 
determined by sampling time-to-failure (TTF) distributions, forecasted obsolescence data 
distributions, and a predetermined refresh/redesign schedule. The event lists are then pushed 
through a cost model to accumulate the discounted life-cycle cost. 
The description in this section is of the base model. Openness is differentiated by 
variations in the system components and architecture (and their associated TTF and 
obsolescence date distributions). The base model does not constitute the entire model. We must 
also model the relative design and qualification overhead (costs) associated with varying the bill 
of materials and system architecture (see the next subsection).  
 
Design and Qualification Costs (CDesign and CRefresh/Redesign) 
CDesign are the costs associated with designing a new system that satisfies a set of 
requirements and include the majority of the costs incurred before the final design is selected, 
including the cost of designing the system, as well as the costs of partial or alternative designs 
considered but not implemented.2 Prototyping and any design overhead costs are also included 
 
2 (i.e., not used for the current system). The ability to repurpose a previously designed subsystem for a new 
application is an enterprise-level cost avoidance strategy (included in CEnterprise). 
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in the design costs. CDesign also includes the Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) costs, which may 
include intellectual property costs and testing and qualification costs to demonstrate that the 
standards, components, subsystems, and complete system meet the required design parameters 
for performance, reliability, security, etc. These costs may be significantly lower for enterprises 
that maintain a library of previously used and qualified hardware and software components. 
 
 
Figure 1. Cost Model Used in This Analysis 
 
The initial system design represents the effort associated with design and qualification of 
the whole system. This event only occurs at the beginning of a life cycle or when a system 
redesign that transitions the system architecture occurs. The cost of the first design event includes 
design cost and qualification cost.  
Design cost is the cost to design or pick the components and modules for the system. A 
COTS component has zero design cost, while a proprietary component has a design cost 
determined by the user. For a module, the design cost is related to the effort required to integrate 
all subcomponents in the module and is proportion to the number of subcomponents. The total 
design cost is the sum of every component/module design cost. 
Qualification cost is the cost to conduct qualification tests for the whole system. Every 
component and module are assigned required qualification tests. The sum of the qualification cost 
of all components/modules is the qualification cost. 
After the system has been in use for some period of time, it may be desirable (or 
necessary) to update or refresh the system to ensure it is still manufacturable and supportable. 
Redesigns that evolve the system functionality and performance may also occur. Refresh costs, 
CRefresh/Redesign, may be similar to those initially incurred in CDesign, except that there is a greater 
opportunity for design reuse, not only of some components or subsystems. 
Production Costs (CProduction) 
CProduction includes all costs to manufacture and deliver the system, including component 
procurement, screening and/or burn-in of hardware components, assembly/manufacturing, and 
any recurring testing costs.  
Production events are defined as the action of purchasing components and the resources 
required to assemble (and functionally test) the system. The production event dates are 
determined by the production schedule.  
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Operation and Support Costs (CO&S) 
All operation and support costs, including those associated with maintenance, sparing, 
obsolescence mitigation, and lack of system availability, fall under CO&S.  
Maintenance (O&S) events occur when there is a component failure. System maintenance 
includes the labor to conduct the process and the cost to obtain a new component. The model 
assumes that the system is fixed instantly so there is no downtime associated with a failure. The 
model also assumes that the maintenance strategy is good-as-new component replacement. If 
the component is still available in the market, it would be procured as needed.  
When the obsolescence of a component occurs, sufficient components are procured and 
held in inventory in order to support the system until the end of support of the system or the next 
system refresh (i.e., a lifetime or bridge buy is made)—these components must cover future 
production and maintenance needs. The cost incurred at the obsolescence event is the 
procurement cost of the components. Inventory (holding) costs are charged when the parts are 
taken from the inventory and used for maintenance. 
Refresh/Redesign Costs (CRefresh/Redesign) 
After the system has been in use for some period of time, it may be desirable (or 
necessary) to update or refresh the system to ensure it is still manufacturable and supportable. 
Redesigns that evolve the system functionality and performance may also occur. Refresh costs, 
CRefresh/Redesign, may be similar to those initially incurred in CDesign, except that there is a greater 
opportunity for design reuse, not only of some components or subsystems, but of the overall 
system architecture as well. 
At a system refresh/redesign event, every component/module in the architecture is 
examined, and some components/modules are refreshed due to obsolescence or an update 
requirement. In the present model, system refresh events are determined before the system life 
cycle starts.3 The cost of refresh, including the cost of redesign and requalification, is based on 
the number of components and modules needed to be refreshed, which is the combination of the 
obsolescence components and the other affected modules/components due to ripple effects. The 
refresh cost of a component/module is equal to the design and qualification cost described in the 
first design event. 
If a component is obsolete when a refresh or redesign is encountered, it is refreshed by 
replacing it with another component that has the same function (assumed to be not obsolete). In 
an architecture where components and modules are linked to each other, one obsolete 
component might affect other connected components and modules, causing them to need to be 
refreshed as well. When the original obsolete component is replaced by a different component 
with the same function, it is possible that the new one would have a different way to integrate with 
the surrounding components/modules. Thus, those surrounding components and modules would 
require redesign and requalification. Further, those refreshed components and modules would 
affect other connected components and modules, causing a ripple effect. Alternatively, if the 
component connects to its surrounding components/modules via an open standard, then the 
component may only require a drop-in replacement that conforms to the open standard. In other 
words, as long as the standard is not obsolete, the ripple effect would stop when it encounters an 
open standard. 
 
3 Models exist that can determine the optimal distribution of refreshes (e.g., Singh and Sandborn [2006]). 
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Enterprise Costs (CEnterprise) 
CEnterprise are the costs incurred at the enterprise level and are shared across all of the 
different types of systems created by the enterprise, which includes the costs to maintain a 
component library or any support infrastructure that is shared by more than one system or 
program. 
Comparing Open and Closed Systems—Relative Cost Models 
It is often not practical to calculate the absolute value of all the life-cycle costs for a 
system—this would may be a nearly impossible task. To assess the cost of openness, we are 
only actually interested in the difference in the costs previously mentioned between two system 
implementations or architectures. This approach is referred to as a relative cost model (Sandborn, 
2017). The advantage of a relative cost model is that all the costs that are a “wash” between the 
two architectures (i.e., the same) and don’t have to be modeled because they simply subtract out. 
The cost difference between two cases is significantly easier to determine than the absolute cost 
of each of the cases. The proposed model never produces absolute costs, only cost differences 
between two cases.  
Figure 2 shows a sample result generated using the model (the data used in this figure 
will be described in ARC-I Case Input Data). On the left side of Figure 2 are the cumulative 
discounted life-cycle costs for A-RCI1 and A-RCI2. In both cases, many time-history solutions are 
shown (each is the result of a unique combination of samples from the input probability 
distributions, so each is one possible time history for the system). The darker solid blue line is the 
mean of the time histories. The life-cycle costs for the two system implementations are NOT 
particularly meaningful because lots of relevant life-cycle costs are left out of the model. The right 
side of Figure 2 shows the difference between the two system costs during the life cycle. The 
difference between the two cases is meaningful if the costs left out of the model are a “wash” (i.e., 
if they approximately subtract out).  
 
Figure 2. Sample Solution Construction of Cumulative Cost Difference.  
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Case Study 
In this section, we present a case study of the Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (A-RCI) 
Sonar System. The A-RCI program, approved for development in June 1996, implemented a 
COTS-based open architecture for a submarine sonar signal processing system. A-RCI 
eliminated traditional system architecture that used specialized military specification and 
proprietary components, embracing the use of COTS and commercial standards, so that the 
sonar signal processing system could be upgraded without altering other existing towed array, 
hull array, and sphere array sonar equipment in the submarine (Guertin & Miller, 1998). As a 
result, the A-RCI program reduced both the time and cost of the periodic upgrade of sonar 
systems in submarines, providing the fleet with state-of-the-art signal processors. 
The transformation from a closed system to a COTS-based open system took several 
years to complete and required a significant amount of money to purchase and install the new 
components. In order to speed up the transition process, the A-RCI adapted a four-phase 
implementation strategy (Guertin & Miller, 1998). In each phase, legacy system functionality was 
partially replaced by COTS processors and displays. In Phase I and Phase II, A-RCI developed 
a Multi-Purpose Processor (MPP) to process the data from both a towed array and a hull array. 
Phase III added Spherical Array MPP (𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) and Switch MPP (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) to replace the legacy 
system spherical array processing functions. Phase IV integrated another high-frequency sail 
array MPP into A-RCI. By the end of Phase IV, a COTS-based open-architecture A-RCI system 
completely replaced the original custom system. 
In order to exercise the model described in Model Development, we will use the model to 
study the life-cycle cost difference between two A-RCI scenarios involving the first two phases of 
the A-RCI architecture. In this case study, we analyze the cost trade-offs of including Phase II in 
the A-RCI implementation strategy. We compare the total life-cycle cost difference with and 
without Phase II to see which one is more beneficial (from a life-cycle cost viewpoint). Figure 3 
shows the configuration of the architectures in the first three phases of the A-RCI. During the 
transition from Phase I to Phase II, no new functionality is added to A-RCI; the primary change 
was the hardware/software configuration in the Multi-Purpose Processor for towed array and hull 
array (𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀). Only the customized components in the 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 were replaced by COTS in 
Phase II to increase data processing capability. If Phase II had been integrated with Phase III, the 
partial transition cost from Phase I to Phase II could have been saved (the cost to initiate a 
transition could have been saved and the present values of redesign and requalification would 
have been less due to a non-zero WACC). On the other hand, including Phase II allowed the 




The two scenarios considered in our model are shown in Figure 4. The first scenario starts 
with Phase I at 𝑆𝑆1, which is directly followed by Phase III at 𝑆𝑆3. The second scenario follows the 
A-RCI phased strategy, starting with Phase I at 𝑆𝑆1, Phase II at 𝑆𝑆2, then Phase III at 𝑆𝑆3.  
 
Figure 3. The First Three Phases of A-RCI Architecture 
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Figure 5 provides a conceptual demonstration of the difference in cumulative cost in both 
scenarios as a function of time. From 𝑆𝑆1 to 𝑆𝑆2 and from 𝑆𝑆3 to end of support, in both scenarios, the 
systems are operated in the same architecture (i.e., Phase I and Phase III). Thus, the cost 
difference between the scenarios is constant before the start of Phase II and after the start of 
Phase III (e.g., a flat line in the graph). It should be emphasized that Figure 5 is the cumulative 
life-cycle cost difference between the two scenarios (not the cumulative life-cycle cost of the 
scenarios). 
 
From 𝑆𝑆1 to 𝑆𝑆2, A-RCI is operated in Phase I in Scenario 1 and in Phase II in Scenario 2. 
Scenario 2 is taking the advantage of COTS-based open architecture in Phase II to lower O&S 
cost. Therefore, the cost difference is decreasing. Since Phase I and Phase II only deal with the 
MPP, and both phases have similar functionality, the cost difference between the two scenarios 
is due primarily to the degree of openness and the fraction of COTS in the implementations.  
𝑆𝑆2 and 𝑆𝑆3 are the times when phase transition occurs. At 𝑆𝑆2 , a phase transition cost is 
charged in Scenario 2. At 𝑆𝑆3, both scenarios are charged the transition cost. The transition cost is 
the sum of a base cost, design/qualification costs, and installation costs. Base cost is the expense 
to initiate a phase transition, which typically includes the administrative cost, the penalty cost due 
to system downtime, etc. Design/qualification cost is related to the architecture change between 
the current phase and the next phase. Installation cost is the cost of purchasing and installing 
new equipment into the fielded systems. Based on the transition cost definition, assume that the 
cost of design, qualification, and installation of an MPP is independent of all the other MPPs in 
 
Figure 4. Scenario Description Considered in the A-RCI Case-Study Model 
 
Figure 5. Life-Cycle Cost Difference Between Scenarios 1 and 2. 
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the architecture. The cost difference at 𝑆𝑆3 would only depend on the design, qualification, and 
installation cost of the 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀  transition from Phase I to Phase II since the expense of 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀  and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 developed in Phase III is a wash. Moreover, the cost difference at 𝑆𝑆2 is 
greater than at 𝑆𝑆3 because the base cost is included in the cost difference at 𝑆𝑆2 and is a wash 
between the two scenarios at 𝑆𝑆3. If the date of implementation of Phase III (𝑆𝑆3) extended, Phase 
II has more influence and the life-cycle cost difference becomes smaller (possibly negative). 
A-RCI Case Input Data 
Figure 6 and Table 1 show the assumed bill of materials (BOM) for the towed array/hull 
array MPP and input data for the cases compared. A-RCI1 represents the architecture in Phase 
I, and A-RCI2 is for Phase II. The data is based on information provided in Guertin and Miller 
(1998) and Schramm (2013).  
There are several drawers in the MPP; a signal conditioner drawer receives towed and 
hull array element data and conducts initial processing. The data was then forwarded to 
allocatable processor drawers for beamforming and further signal processing. The final data was 
sent out to the Control Display Workstation for remote display. 
The difference between the MPP architectures in the Phase I and Phase II is the 
components. In Phase I, a Sun SPARC processor card is used in the signal condition drawer, 
which is replaced by a Motorola PowerPC processor card in Phase II. For the allocatable 
processor drawers, there are three custom beamforming cards and four Quad i860 cards in Phase 
I, which were replaced by Quad PowerPC COTS cards in Phase II. Overall, A-RCI2 is nominally 




4 A-RCI2 (more open) has components that are more accessible and lower design/integration costs and 
production costs. 
 
Figure 6. A-RCI Phase I and II Architectures Assumed 
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Table 1. Maintenance Strategy and Cost Assumptions5 
Production schedule 60 systems6 are produced in first five years (i.e., 12 
systems per year) 
Failure replace/repair Good-as-new replace/repair 
Average cost of maintenance 
per failure 
$10,000/failure 
Average inventory holding 
cost per component 
$100/part/year 
Spare buffer Zero buffer: number of spare procurements would be the 
same as the number of failures until the next 
refresh/transition 
Discount rate (WACC) 1%/year 
Non-recurring cost of refresh Base cost: $0.5 million/refresh 
Qualification cost per new component: $0.2 million 
Maximum non-recurring cost (entire system): $1.5 million 
Cost to backfit one ship set Total component procurement cost: $12,000  
Installation cost: $3,000  
 
In order to make sure that the cost difference from the two scenarios is solely due to the 
openness difference, factors that may affect life-cycle cost are isolated. For example, the renewal 
function (i.e., the expected number of failures and accompanied repairs in time) plays an 
important role in O&S cost. To minimize the effect caused by renewal function differences, A-
RCI1 and A-RCI2 are assumed to have similar reliability. 
Modeling Results 
In order to create a valid apples-to-apples comparison of the two system management 
scenarios, we assume that each case is managed under its individual optimum O&S strategy. In 
order to accomplish this, we must first determine the optimal management of obsolescence (i.e., 
optimum refresh schedule, assuming bridge buys of discontinued components between 
refreshes).  
Optimum Refresh Schedule 
To compare the life-cycle cost difference between two architectures, the first step is to find 
each architecture’s optimum refresh schedule.7 It is inappropriate to compare life-cycle cost of the 
two architectures assuming the same refresh schedule. More frequent refreshing could 
disadvantage a closed system, which has a higher refresh cost. Conversely, fewer refreshes will 
increase the cost of inventory and bridge buys in an open system due to the shorter procurement 
life of COTS.8 
 
5 The results for the case study are highly dependent on the refresh and maintenance costs in this table. 
These costs were assumed and may not be representative of reality. 
6 The A-RCI program was expanded to provide improvements that could be backfit into over 60 ship sets. 
(Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation [DOT&E], 2002). 
7 In the actual A-RCI program, the systems are refreshed every two years in order to take advantage of the 
advanced performance of evolving processors. In our case, the optimum strategy is selected based on a 
purely cost perspective. 
8 Rapid technology evolution has resulted in fast-paced product development and short product support 
lifetimes for COTS. COTS vendors release new products every year and are unwilling to support their 
products for extended periods after procurement. 
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In order to evaluate the optimum refresh schedule, we compared the partial life-cycle cost9 
with different refresh strategies. Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the partial life-cycle cost as a function 
of end-of support year for different refresh strategies. For the same architecture with different 
refresh strategies, the non-recurring cost such as first design cost is the same. Different refresh 
strategies only affect the O&S cost and refresh cost. In Figures 7 and 8, the slope of the partial 
life-cycle cost represents the rate of cost increase. Thus, optimum refresh strategy is selected by 
choosing the strategy that has the minimum average slope. For A-RCI1, the optimum strategy is 
to treat every obsolescence event with a lifetime buy, while a six-year refresh schedule is the 
optimum strategy for A-RCI2 (for the data assumed in this case study). 
 
9 We use the term “partial life-cycle cost” to refer to the portion of the life-cycle cost included in the model, 
which does not include all contributions to the life-cycle cost of the case. See the discussion in Comparing 
Open and Closed Systems – Relative Cost Models. 
 
Figure 6. Partial Life-Cycle cost of A-RCI1 Given Different Refresh Strategies. LTB = all lifetime 
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To understand the factors that influence the choice of optimum refresh strategy, we 
consider the composition of the relative life-cycle cost. Since the design, qualification, and 
production are the same for given different refresh strategies, only O&S cost and refresh cost 
would contribute to the difference. The increase of refresh period has an opposite effect on the 
increasing rate of O&S cost and refresh cost. Assume that the refresh cost for each refresh is 
approximately the same. For a longer refresh period, the average refresh cost per year would be 
less. On the other hand, more expense, such as purchasing spares and inventory management, 
would be spent in order to support the systems. Therefore, the weights of O&S cost and refresh 
cost would determine which refresh strategies are the best. For a closed system A-RCI, refresh 
cost is larger and dominates the total cost; therefore, a lifetime buy strategy with zero refresh cost 
would be the optimum. 
Cost Difference Comparison Between Scenarios 
After determining the optimum refresh schedule for each architecture, the two scenarios 
are considered. The first scenario starts with Phase I, then transitions directly to Phase III, and 
uses a bridge buy strategy to manage obsolescence. The second scenario follows the A-RCI 
phase strategy, starting with Phase I with bridge buy strategy. At year 5, the architecture 
transitions from Phase I to Phase II. During Phase II, the system implements a six-year refresh 
schedule, which occurs in years 11, 17, 23, and so on. The transition to Phase III occurs at variable 
dates.  
Figure 9 shows the life-cycle cost difference as a function of when Phase III is 
implemented. The life-cycle cost difference starts at a positive value ($2 million) when the Phase 
III implementation year is approximately year 6 and decreases as the date of Phase III 
implementation increases. The negative slope of this life-cycle cost function indicates that the 
O&S cost of A-RCI1 in Scenario 1 is higher than A-RCI2 in Scenario 2. There are peaks at years 
11, 17, 23, and 29 when refresh takes place and adds refresh cost in Scenario 2. The cost break-
even point of the two scenarios occurs when the implantation year is between 12 to 13. If A-RCI 
implements Phase III before year 12, the difference (Scenario 2 – Scenario 1) is positive, 
indicating that the cost avoidance of A-RCI 2 is smaller than the implementation cost of Phase II, 
so Scenario 2 is more expensive. By contrast, if A-RCI implements Phase III after year 13, the 
life-cycle cost difference becomes negative, indicating that the cost avoidance in O&S from Phase 
 
Figure 7. Partial life-cycle cost of A-RCI2 given different refresh strategies. LTB = all lifetime 
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II (i.e., COTS-based open system) has paid off.10 In short, the cost difference is dominated by 
transition cost difference before year 12 and is dominated by O&S cost difference after year 12 
since the O&S cost difference grows faster. For instance, since Scenario 1 has a smaller transition 
cost but larger O&S cost, Scenario 1 has a lower cost before year 12 but higher cost after year 
12. This simulation result indicates that the utility of Phase II (from a purely cost perspective) 
depends on the implementation schedule for Phase III. It shows that after the implementation of 
Phase II, it takes at least seven years for Phase II to pay off (from a life-cycle cost perspective). 
In this case, when Phase I and II are implemented in year 0 and 5 respectively, Phase III should 
be introduced after year 12 so that the A-RCI can benefit from Phase II architecture. In other 
words, if A-RCI is required to introduce Phase III before year 12 and Phase II is implemented in 
year 5, we should choose the implementation strategy in Scenario 1 and eliminate the option of 
Phase II.  
Based on the simulation results, the probability distribution of the cost difference for a 
given Phase III implementation year can be calculated. Figure 10 is an example of when Phase 
III is implemented in year 13. From this distribution, the mean value of the cost difference is 
approximately $648,000, and the sample standard deviation is $761,000. The probability that the 
cost difference is less than zero is approximately 82%, indicating that if Phase III is implemented 
in year 13, there is an 82% probability that Scenario 2 is more beneficial than Scenario 1. 
Cost Difference Comparison With Different Number of Systems 
In the previous section, we considered 60 systems manufactured in the first five years. In 
this section, we focus on how the number of systems manufactured and fielded influences the 
value of the cost difference between the two scenarios. In the model, we considered 40, 60, and 
80 systems manufactured and fielded in the first five years. Figure 11 shows the life-cycle cost 
difference result with different numbers of systems. Each curve is the mean value of 50 time-
history results. According to the graph, the cost break-even points of the three curves are all 
between year 12 and 13 years. 80 systems has the highest positive value at year 6 and has the 
 
10 This is NOT a general result (it is an artifact of the data assumed).  
 
 
Figure 8. Life-Cycle Cost Difference Analysis Result as a Function of the Phase III 
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highest rate of decrease in the years that follow. More systems lead to higher administrative cost 
during phase transition. In year 5, the transition cost for more systems is higher in Scenario 2 and 
stays zero in Scenario 1 (since there is no transition in Scenario 1). Therefore, increasing the 
number of systems enhances the cost difference in year 5. In addition, with more fielded systems, 
more failures would occur, and the O&S cost difference between A-RCI1 and A-RCI would be 
larger as well, resulting in a steeper curve in Figure 11.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
It is often taken for granted that the use of open system architecture (OSA) decreases the 
total life-cycle cost of a system. However, there is a lack of studies quantifying the cost avoidance 
and assessing the circumstances under which this assumption is true. This paper presents a 
 
Figure 9. Probability Distribution of Life-Cycle Cost Difference When Phase III Is Implemented 
in Year 13 
 
































Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 18 - 
 
framework for quantitative analysis of OSA by modeling life-cycle cost difference associated with 
system openness, including open architecture, open standard, and commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS). The cost impact of openness is evaluated by converting these concepts of openness 
into lifetime events and corresponding costs.  
A stochastic discrete-event simulation model was developed to determine the difference in 
life-cycle cost between two versions of the same system. The model generates events based on 
system information (BOM, architecture, reliability, etc.), and the consequent cost of each event is 
then calculated. The sums of total event cost in each of the two versions are differenced to 
determine which is more beneficial. This model can calculate the cost avoided and added due to 
openness. The simulation results can also be applied to management strategy optimization. 
An A-RCI case study has been used to demonstrate the application of quantitative analysis 
on cost in relation to system openness. The life-cycle cost difference between two scenarios (with 
and without A-RCI Phase II) was evaluated as a function of the A-RCI Phase III implementation 
date. It should be noted that the results presented in this paper are preliminary and highly 
dependent on the input data, which may not reflect reality. 
Future work will include several elements. First, more openness impacts should be considered 
in the model, for example, the impact of open source on software. It is believed that open source 
reduces the development cost since a wider community of developers are able to review and test 
the code. However, when the source code is published openly, hackers can easily find and exploit 
vulnerabilities in the software.11 Thus, the tradeoff is that more money would need to be spent on 
cybersecurity enhancement. Second, further study will focus on developing the relationship 
between system openness and life-cycle cost. A model of life-cycle cost associated with COTS 
Functional Density has been proposed from a software perspective (Abts, 2002). For a complex 
system integrating both hardware and software, a more sophisticated model is needed. Moreover, 
since system openness is not just about the number of COTS, a quantitative metric for system 
openness should also be developed. 
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